I visited Ironsi at his official residence, the Flag Staff House, at No. 1 Glover Road, Ikoyi, Lagos, as he was a bit indisposed. Incidentally, my personal relationship with Ironsi had always been very cordial, and I had nothing against him as a person or as a military officer at the time. When I called on him that night, he was not in bed as expected of somebody suffering from what he called “severe cold and lumbago” but was sitting with some people inside the compound (but outside the bungalow) on the shore of the lagoon nearby. He quickly left the lagoon side and advanced to meet me and took me inside the house. The other people never joined us. Ironsi informed me that he had decided to postpone his visit to Sokoto to spend Sallah there at the invitation of his friend”, the Sultan of Sokoto, the spiritual leader of northern Muslims and a cousin of the Sardauna, Premier of the Northern Region. As I was going out of Ironsi’s house, felt rather guilty for inconveniencing him and his other guests still sitting outside. So I decided to apologize to them, and I spotted at least Ifeajuana amongst the guests, who was cited in the Special Branch Report as one of the coup plotters.
Another well calculated move by Ironsi was to post to the command of infantry battalions stationed outside Lagos and Ibadan areas, of he considered reliable or weak, and in case of the latter, support strong Igbo deputies. He posted Odumegwu Ojukwu to Kano, Fajuyi Enugu and Sodeinde (killed during the coup) to Kaduna. The idea was to ensure that in the event of staging a coup, Ironsi could rally support from these areas. The problems of Lagos and Ibadan could be attended to by him personally and this was easy as adequate arrangements were made to eliminate the “enemy” senior military commanders of units stationed in these areas, Finally, the policy pursued by the Ironsi government on assumption of power was decided in favour of the long-term interest of the Igbos who staged the first coup – the abolishing of federal administrative structure of the country, the unification of the civil and judicial services, failure to deal with the rebel army officers who cold bloodedly and cowardly murdered their fellow officers who were not given a chance to defend themselves in the military tradition, the mass promotion of Igbo officers to fill vacancies left by their departed colleagues, and assumption of command of strategic military units.
Judging from the foregoing, it appears that General Ironsi was probably aware of the coup plan at least in its broad outline, and from personal standpoint would he-expected to welcome the manner in which it was executed, i.e., the elimination of those who were considered “dangerous” officers likely to challenge his supremacy after the ousting of the civilian government – Brigadiers Maimalari and Ademulegun, Col. Kur Muhammed, and Lt. Cols. Largema and Pam – all of whom were immensely popular with their troops, who could be used to prevent Ironsi’s ascension to political power. When he succeeded, Ironsi styled himself head of the Federal Military Government and supreme commander of the armed forces, a designation which though normal in military tradition of a generalissimo during war time was borrowed from the title of a book: The Supreme Command, which Ironsi presented to me a few months before the first coup.
Ironsi no doubt, had been nursing for sometime the idea of assuming the supreme command not only of the Nigerian Armed forces but also of the country itself. This objective was achieved at the cost of untimely deaths of many fine officers, a fate to which Ironsi himself ultimately succumbed during the July 1966 counter-coup
The counter-coup was, as expected, staged by the remnants of the northern officer corps who as at January 1966 were of the ranks of major, captain, and subalterns (except Gowon who was Lt. Col.). These officers were seething with rage, anger and bitterness over the murder of their beloved and respected senior officers whom many regarded as heroes and were ready to risk their lives to avenge their deaths. The officers were also under political pressure to do something to retrieve the honour (mutunci) of the North. “The Northern officers were apprehensive that a repeat performance of January 15th, 1966 incident might culminate in their annihilation.” The northern other ranks were particularly engaged that their officers had let them down by allowing the episode of January 966 to occur and by not taking swift action to avenge it. Some of the soldiers were calling their officers derogatory names such as mata (wonen) who were weaklings and incapable of any manly heroic action and more ominously threatening to “do it themselves” and deal with all army officers, northerners and others as well.
The hatred arid derision of the northern army officers spread to northern civilian population almost all of whom were of the opinion that General Ironsi was definitely in the know of the coup plan at least in its broad outline especially such matters as the elimination of what was considered “dangerous” officers likely to challenge his supremacy after ousting of the civilians. The civilians became hostile to the northern military establishment to the extent of refusing to socialise with the officers. It was rumoured that there was pressure from some civilian parents of army officers’ wives to desert their husbands for their cowardly behaviour in failing to retrieve the honour or mutunci of the northern people. Thus the northern officers had to do something to save their skin and preserve whatever little honour they had. And so they struck 29th July, 1966, in broad daylight as promised by Lt. Col. Hassan Usman Katsina, the military governor of the North, unlike the executors of the January 1966 coup who murdered their military colleagues in their sleep. May the souls of all those killed during the January and July insurrections, military and civilians, rest in peace, or as we say in HausaAllah Yaji kanMusulmi.
The take over of the Federal Military Government by Ironsi and his associates put the North in a disadvantaged position vis a vis the South the newly established Supreme Military Council, dominated by the latter The composition of the council was as follows:
General Aguiyi Ironsi – Head of State (Chairman)
Lt. Col. David Ejoor – Military Governor (Mid- West)
Lt. Odumegwu Ojukwu – Military Governor (East)
Lt. Col. Fajuyi – Military Governor (West).
II
Major Hassan Usman Katsina – Military Governor (North)
Lt. Col Y Gowon – Chief of Staff (Army)
‘Louis Edet – Inspector General of Police
Kam Salem – Deputy Inspector General of Police
George Kurubo – Commander (Air Force)
Commodore J.A.E. Wey – Commander (Navy)
Thus out often members of the Supreme Military Council, the North had three, whilst the South bad seven including the chairman. This was very irksome to the northern establishment which used to be in the forefront in running Nigeria’s affairs since independence in 1960. As if this lopsidedness was not enough, Ironsi introduced measures that would further marginalise the North and non-Igbos in general. Promotions and postings in the armed forces were heavily tilted against the North which had already lost its senior officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel and above (with one exception). Then suddenly and without consultation, Ironsi promulgated the Unification Decree No. 34 abolishing the federal structure of Nigeria and also unified the Civil and Judicial Services, The protection which the regions hitherto enjoyed in controlling and running these services by their -indigenes was lost. The North was the hardest hit by these measures.
Thus, within a few days of the, promulgation of the Unification Decree, the North erupted spontaneously in violence during which many Igbos were killed. The northerners wanted to secede from the federation arewa or araba – was the clarion call by virtually all northerners. The July 1966 counter-coup was intended to achieve this objective but common sense prevailed and the unity of the country was preserved. However, the Eastern Region headed by Ojukwu achieved de-facto separation by expelling all non-easterners from the East and urging all easterners living elsewhere in Nigeria to return home. Seizure of federal government’s property and funds located in the Eastern Region invited sanctions by the federal government. The situation in the country was very tense and needed only small incidents to erupt. Thus, when Radio Cotonou, Dahomey (now Benin Republic) announced that northerners were being killed in the East, there were revenge killings of Igbos and others in the North in September/October 1966. The security situation in the country continued to deteriorate despite spirited efforts by Nigerian chiefs and “Leaders of Thought” as well as foreign well-wishers of Nigeria to reconcile the various factions.
In the end Lt. Col. Odumegwu-Ojukwu declared the Eastern Re “Republic of Biafra”, thus seceding from the federation of Niger 30th May, 1967. This action was preceded by dividing Nigeria into n states, three of them in the Eastern Region, one for Igbo and two eastern minorities living in the Niger Delta, Calabar and Ogoja areas declaration of Biafra was followed by dismissal of Ojukwu from Nigerian Army and governorship, police action and the commencement of civil war on 6th July, 1967.
The crises and conflicts and aftermath that afflicted Nigeria ben January, 1966 and January, 1970 were monumental tragedies we ought to .have put behind us so that the country could forge ahead. Alas, that not been the case as testified during public hearing of the Human Right Violations and Investigations Commission (Justice Oputa Panel), he Enugu and Abuja in July and September/October 2001 respectively. Pan-Igbo organisation, Ohaneze Ndi Igbo, presented a petition to Oputa Panel accusing the peoples of the North of all sorts of crimes against the Igbos and demanded a reparation sum of over eight trillion Naira (N8,000,000,000,000) to compensate them for alleged losses lives and properties during the crisis. It was surprising that present Igbo could make such accusations against the North considering that Ohaneze Ndi Igbo under the responsible leadership of the late Sir Francis Ibiarn, concluded that:
…of the debt .of blood between the North and the Igbos, the Igbos started the cycle, the North retaliated. It was the same story in the North as well as in Igboland – Blood spoke to blood – and the Igbos who started it all cannot complain that more of their people died in it.
In their petition to the Oputa Panel at Enugu, part of the conclusions of Ohaneze Ndi Igbo concern the troubles related to the 1966 mass at and counter-massacre, pogroms and counter-pogroms which occurred between communities in the Northern Region and communities in 1 Eastern Region in a reciprocal fashion. It is regrettable that some Nigerians appear to want to revive the precipitating conditions for repeat performances of the incidents of January and July, 1966. Captain Ben Gbulie’s book, Nigeria’s Five Majors in which raging remarks were made about assassinated northern leaders, was provocative, to say the least.
He was one of the key actors of the coup at Kaduna when the Sardauna of Sokoto, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello was assassinated. He was also a leading member of the group of Igbos who presented Ohaneze Ndi Igbo’s petition to the Oputa Panel at Enugu in July 2001. He was summoned to appear before the commission at Abuja in September/October 2001 at the request of the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) (a northern umbrella organization) which cross-examined Captain Gbulie. He did not show any remorse and still believed that the 15 January, 1966 coup was staged to pre-empt ajihad to be launched by Northern Muslims led by the Sardauna by 16th January, 1966 though a number of Christian military officers who could have assisted their brethren in resisting the jihad were also killed on January 15th, 1966. Instead of answering questions from ACF Counsel, Gbulie was diversionary and unco-operative. When the son of late Lt. Col. Pam, who was slain during the January, 1966 coup, asked for apology from Gbulie, who cast aspersions on his father in the said Nigeria s Five Majors, Gbulie did not respond. When young Pam requested the panel to reconcile him and Gbulie, neither the panel, on which Pam’s mother, Elizabeth Pam, sat, nor Gbulie said a word, talkless of coming to embrace Pam, as was done by other petitioners and accused at some sittings of the commission. I was present at this public hearing and was utterly disgusted at this unbecoming behaviour on the part of Captain Gbulie. I could not help remarking – Akwai sauran rina a Kaba (roughly – we are not yet out of the woods). It is hoped !hat Gbulie and his ilk would have a change of heart, retrace the dangerous steps they are taking and give peace a chance to reign in Nigeria once again.
Concluded
Culled from Kurfi’s autobiography: ‘My Life and Times’
Join Daily Trust WhatsApp Community For Quick Access To News and Happenings Around You.
