In his lengthy cross-examination of two and half pages, learned Counsel for the appellant saw no reason to cross-examine the witness on the evidence reproduced above. In my view, appellant brought out the dagger with the intention to stab with it and when he stabbed his victim with it, he did that with the intention to kill him or to cause a grievous bodily harm to him. Intention can be inferred from the instrument used and the part of the body on which the injury was inflicted and the force with which the stabbing was done to the extent that the victim fell down immediately and died.
It would be unreasonable to conclude from the facts that the appellant who came out of his room with a dagger and stabbed the deceased on the left side of his chest to such depth that the deceased fell down and died, did not intend to kill the deceased or cause him grievous bodily harm. Appellant was a soldier and knew where to strike to kill. It was a meditated and brutal attack on a defenceless relation of the appellant.
Learned Counsel for the appellant made the curious submission that:
“It was not established that the dagger recovered from the appellant was specifically procured for the murder of the deceased and deliberately sharpened for that purpose. Appellant’s evidence that the dagger was part of the military uniform which he travelled out with on the same day of the incident was not contradicted.”
Appellant gave two different accounts of the dagger – that it is part of his military uniform and that it is his personal property. In any case, I have demonstrated that a dagger or any other form of weapon cannot be part of a soldier’s uniform. A soldier’s uniform is distinct from his weapon which is issued to him as and when due. May be learned Counsel thinks it will be less than murder if a dagger sharpened for dismembering the carcase of a goat is used intentionally to kill a person. It is immaterial that the dagger was not sharpened or that it was sharpened for a purpose other than killing a person or causing him a grievous bodily harm.
The lower Court was right when it affirmed the judgment of the trial Court that the act of the appellant was intentional. I resolve issue one against the appellant.
Issue two is:
“Whether the defence granted by Section 24 of the Criminal Code was not improperly denied the appellant by the way the Court below held that the defence of accident can only be credible and thus acceptable if there had been a physical fight between the parties prior to the emergence of the appellant to the scene.”
The trial Court found, and the Court below affirmed, that there was no fight between the appellant and the deceased. The evidence of PW3, Ugorji Onyedinma, who is the Secretary of Aladinma, was specific that “there was no quarrel between the parties on that day prior to this incident.”
On this point, he was not shaken under cross-examination. Section 24 of the Criminal Code invoked by the appellant provides:
“Subject to the express provisions of this Code relating to negligent acts and omissions, a person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission which occurs independently of the exercise of his will, or for an event which occurs by accident.”
The Section has two arms:
(1) an act or omission which occurs independently of the exercise of the will; and
(2) an event which occurs by accident.
The first arm has been dealt with in issue one. Learned Counsel for the appellant said that the prosecution should have conducted a medical inquiry as to the state of health of the appellant who said he was sick and received medical treatment. But the sickness had nothing to do with the crime. In one of his statements, Exhibit B, the appellant said inter alia:
“I felt sick and has (sic) been going for treatment until on the 24th February 1994 which I finished taking my treatment. And I was about to leave for my Unit on the 20th before this incident of murder occurred to me.”
See page 28 of the records.
Appellant had finished his treatment and was well and ready to leave for his Unit days before the incident. There is no need for the prosecution to conduct inquiries into his medical record for the purpose of prosecuting the appellant for the offence of murder.
A plea of automatism is of no avail to the appellant. Evidence shows, the trial Court found, and the Court below affirmed, that the appellant was master of his senses when he deliberately stabbed his victim to death. If the appellant suffered from amnesia at the material time, it was a selective one. Appellant is not “a bloody civilian”. He is a soldier trained to kill. He knew where to strike to kill.
On the second arm of Section 24 of the Criminal Code, appellant cannot bring his act of stabbing the deceased to death within the meaning of “event which occurred by accident”. In his statement to the Police, he said: “… out of annoyance and self defence I stabbed the deceased…”
Annoyance is a feeling of being slightly angry. An act done by someone slightly angry cannot be said to have occurred by accident.
Also self-defence is a deliberate act to save oneself from impending danger and cannot be attributed to accident. Appellant, a trained soldier armed with a dagger, who attacked and killed an unarmed and defenceless civilian who did not in any way attack him, cannot rely on self-defence. He was not defending himself from anything or anyone. This issue is also resolved against the appellant.
I list once more the three elements of the offence of murder under Section 319 (1) of the Criminal Code:
(1) The fact of death of the victim.
(2) The fact that the death of the victim was caused by an act of the appellant.
(3) The fact that the act of the appellant resulting in the death of the victim was intentional.
The first two elements of the offence were conceded by the appellant and so required no proof. There is no need to establish the truth of a fact already admitted. See Ajikawo v. Ansaido (Nig) Ltd (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 173) 359.
On the evidence, and as found by the trial Court and affirmed by the Court below, the third element was proved beyond reasonable doubt. All the defences available to the appellant were considered and rejected. Therefore the prosecution discharged its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The two issues having been resolved against the appellant, his appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. I endorse the judgment of the lower Court affirming the decision of the trial Court.
Appeal dismissed.
