Mali and the Azawad question

The coup d’état of 21st March 2012 by middle ranking army officers In Mali this week signals significant political regression for the coming years. From numerous press reports, it started as a mutiny by drunken soldiers at the Kati barracks in the outskirts of Bamako demanding for more arms and resources to fight the Tuareg rebellion in the north. They felt that neither President Amadou Toumani Toure nor the Defence Minister, Saddio Gassama was sup- porting them. Since January, the Malian army had been defeated by Tuareg rebels and forced to withdraw from eight towns in northern Mali. The emergence of Captain Amadou Sanogo obviously surprised even the putschists themselves as they announced they have power and needed time to think of what to do with it.

The whole world immediately and unequivocally condemned the coup d’état and called for an immediate return of the country to the constitutional and democratically elected government of Presi- dent Toure. The coup, coming one month before Presidential elections is not only arbitrary, but inherently negating to the standards, values and principles of governance accept- able to the West African peoples as enshrined in the spirit and letter of the ECOWAS Supplementary protocol on Good Governance and Democracy. It is a circumvention of the collective will and sovereignty of the people of Mal. Already, 38 political parties have established a political front to oppose the putschists. Senior army officers also appear to be opposed to the coup.

Over the past two decades, Mali’s security landscape has been characterised by urban banditry as well as inter-community and religious conflicts. In addition, the country witnessed the Tuareg rebellion in the North between1990-1996 and a new insurgency started in January 2012. In addition, trans-border criminality by gangs trafficking cigarettes, drugs and weapons and the presence of terrorists affiliated with Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) makes the country one of the most insecure in Africa.

Mali is a huge country with 1, 241 328 square km and a frontier of 7240 km with seven countries – Algeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal and Mauritania. The essence of the problems posed by events in Northern Mali is that national sovereignty is challenged and state authority is absent in a significant part of the country’s territory. This problem has a sub-regional dimension as the neighbouring countries have similar challenges. In 1970, the late Libyan leader, Col Gaddafi called on all Tuaregs in Mali and Niger to move to Libya as citizens and many of them took up the offer. The younger generation joined the Islamic Legion and were active in the United Front Movement of Azawad that fought for autonomy of North- ern Mali. Following the 1992 Pact,

The zone was demilitarized. Unfortunately however, the ex-combatants became fertile recruitment ground for traffickers and terrorists. Armed robbery, hostage taking and assassi- nations became the order of the day. The absence of the state in social provisioning, rising poverty, youth unemployment and underemployment have all contributed in creating the present social conditions that have led to this state of affairs in which Al-Qaida has free range in the northern part of the country. The pacific form of Islam that has existed for centuries in that part of the world has been radicalized in a rapid and destabilising manner.

Captain Amadou Sanogo is taking over power in dangerous times. The Tuareg rebels are on the ascendency and are threatening to take over Kidal and Gao over the coming days and have told him to grant self- determination or face the music. The senior officers are against him and 38 political parties have established a common front against him. Captain Sanogo has however formed a March 22nd Movement to gather support. His platform is to successfully defeat the Tuareg rebellion. The reality on the ground is that the country is moving towards intensification of violent conflict and full blown civil war. The worst case scenario is total collapse of state authority and spread of violence in Northern Mali. This can have a domino effect in the sub- region extending to Algeria, Mauritania and Niger. The sub-region is a huge desert zone and difficult to control. It is suitable territory for trafficking in arms and drugs and it’s also rich in petroleum, natural gas, uranium, gold, diamonds, cop- per and phosphate. The vast spaces beyond state control in the zone are fertile grounds for terrorist groups and their reach can expand quite rapidly. Over the past two decades, Mali’s security landscape has been characterised by urban banditry, inter-community and religious conflicts. The present conjuncture with the rapid growth of narco-trafficking, proliferation of small arms and light weapons following the return of large numbers of Libyan combatants of Malian origin and the activism of AQIM makes Mali one of the hottest conflict spots with high probability and possibility of instability.

The best case scenario is to revive the April 1992 National Pact signed with Tuareg insurgents. The demilitarization agreed to in the pact can only be implementing if the state is ready to make real concessions to the Tuareg rebels determined to get their Azawad Republic. Since the mutiny of 23rd May 2006, the Malian Government has taken many initiatives to restore peace. These include the Algiers Accord, the Kidal Forum on security and development in the North and the development of the ten year plan of action. This was followed with the subsequent development of a comprehensive special programme for peace, security and development in Northern Mali. None of these programmes were implemented and the story of Mali under President Toure is one of lost opportunities. When he sent a ministerial delegation to Libya to facilitate the return of Tuareg combatants, he certainly did not appear to priori- ties self-preservation. His attitude towards the strong presence of Al- Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb has also been to pretend that he has see nothing. There has in fact been rising tension between him and his neigh- bours in Niger and Mauritania who felt he has not been doing enough.

Malian civil society has been very active in encouraging and organising peace education and dialogue to address conflict issues. Indeed, the programme developed by Government has benefitted immensely from civil society engagement. Conflict management programmes however cannot work without active engagement by the State. Mali needed to carry out a massive programme of humanitarian aid for the Libyan returnees but that did not happen. They had lost their savings in Libya and had been chased out with ignominy by racist anti-Gaddafi militants. They were well trained fighters and had arms. They had lost their Libyan benefactor and the rest, as they say is history.

The leader of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, Bilal Ag Acherit has declared their position. The ball he said is in the hands of mail, they give them their self-determination or they take it themselves. It is important that the international com- munity in concert with the United Nations, African Union and the ECOWAS prioritise the resolution of the State crisis in Mali. A coup can- not be allowed to survive in Africa. The problem however is bigger than the coup, the Azawad question must be placed on the table as part of the issues to resolve.